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Can Venture Capital Trigger Innovation: New
Evidence From China
Abstract: With the continuing globalization of the world economy,
countries seek to develop and support their venture capital market.
Whether venture capital really can trigger innovation or vice versa or
not at all is of interest not only to academia, but also to commercial
rms, venture capital institutions, and government agencies. Based on
statistical data collected from the Chinese market, this paper aims
to provide material insight on, rstly, whether venture capital can
inuence innovation and, if so, by how much; and secondly, whether
venture capital leads innovation or whether it is innovation which
leads developments in venture capital. The innovation of the sample
rms is quantied by the consideration of patent counts and associated
productivity growth. The sample rms collected from a group of
innovation active industries, are selected by a number of discriminative
covariates widely cited in the extant literature. The empirical ndings
demonstrate that venture capital has a positive but limited impact
on innovations in the current market. Innovation and productivity
growth in particular, may also be triggered by the growth potential of
rms. We therefore propose a few possible unique factors to explain
the underlying mechanism of venture capital in promoting innovation
within the context of the Chinese market.
Keywords: Venture Capital; Innovation; Patents; Total Factor
Productivity
1 Introduction
Nowadays, most countries in the world are keen to support research and
development in new technology given the growing realisation of the importance
of innovation to a booming economy. China's commitment to innovation was
inscribed in 2011 in \A Roadmap for Five Years" 1. Accordingly the Chinese
government is putting more eort into supporting research into diverse elds
including automotive, pharmaceuticals and other scientic areas. The number of
patent applications has grown rapidly since 2002. The China Intellectual Property
Statistical Yearbook 2 documented 205,544 applications in 2002 whilst 1,109,428
in 2011. The Derwent World Patents Index 3 estimated that by 2015, Chinese
owned companies would be generating 500,000 patents, a number 25% more than
the number of patents the US is expected to have.
China's Venture Capital (VC) industry began to develop in the 1980s and
its rapid growth commenced in 1998 when the Chinese government implemented
a series of policies to stimulate and encourage the development of high-tech
companies and VC investment. Global studies have demonstrated a positive
2relationship between VC and innovation [34, 10, 52] and VC-backed rms have
created almost one third of total market value of all listed companies in the US
market given that VCs provide nance to support start-up rms and also oer
them expertise in innovation and marketing. However, other studies show that such
positive relationships are due to VCs' diligent screening for rms with an already
high performance potential [29, 9, 17].
Even though VC does theoretically spur innovation, when it comes to the
immature market like China, such an eect might be reduced. Though China
has experienced fast economic growth over the past decade, comparing to those
mature and well-developed markets, the Chinese market is still young and under-
reported in the literature. China's VC market, in particular, has its own unique
patterns attributable to special market condition such as a strong interventionist
government, inexperienced venture capitalists, inecient legislative systems for
VC investment, Private Equity (PE)-like VC investments [35], low equity ratio in
the rms' ownership structure and immature Limited Partner (LP). VC in China
mainly invests at rm's pre-IPO stages rather than seed stage thereby a more
limited impact upon rm level innovation. Thus, it still remains unknown whether
the eorts of the Chinese government and entrepreneurs in deepening the VC
market could trigger innovation and/or stimulate economy as expected. Hence, the
aim of this study is to test the role of VC in promoting innovation under China's
special nancial market condition. Also, by analyzing the correlation between VC
nancing and rms' innovation in China, we hope to provide new evidence and
add to the prevailing literature.
However, the challenges for the paper lies in two main elds, namely to
appropriately dene innovation and in uncovering the direct casual economic
impact of VC nancing upon rms' innovation activities in particular and their
performance in general.
 The denition of innovation has yet to be unambiguously agreed by either
market participants or academia. Popular measurements include number
of patents acquired, R&D input and Total Factor Productivity (TFP)
growth. It seems, however, that any of those three cannot be an unbiased
measurement to innovation. For example, patents have multiple categories
and rms may not always patent their innovations. Besides, unlike well-
developed countries that can oer well-documented data and large samples of
rms supported by VC nance, the Chinese VC market, although emerging
from the 1980's onwards, does not oer robust or relevant accounting
data until 2006 onwards. Relevant rms to incorporate into the data set
are thus limited. Indeed, according to ocial statistics, by the end of
2011, there are 443 out of 2443 listed rms that were reported to be VC
nanced. In this study, we only focus on the rms being listed on Shanghai
stock market, Shenzhen Stock market (A-share market which includes both
Chinese mainboard and Small and Medium Enterprises board) and ChiNext
(the Chinese version of Nasdaq for growth enterprises) as the accounting
information of unlisted rms cannot be accessible from the public ocial
data base.
 The examination on relationship between VC and innovation should depend
on two identical rms whose only dierence is their nancial patterns, that
3is we should compare the innovation of a VC-backed rm ideally with its
counterpart that had not received VC. However, such counterfactual samples
and their dependent conditions are unobservable and dicult to nd.
Therefore we then propose to use two methods to overcome those identied
diculties.
 A new measure of innovation. Instead of forming a nancing function [22]
that assumes a linear relationship among dierent indicators, we consider
R&D-backed patent counts and TFP growth, or a Malmquist index,
separately as two independent measures of innovation. The patent counts
can be considered as a direct indicator of innovation, while TFP growth is
the measure of eciency and its inference links to the variables applied in
calculating TFP. The variable selection is therefore critical.
 Finding counterfactual samples. In order to accurately estimate the direct
impact of VC on innovation, we have to match each VC-backed rm with
a rm which is as similar as possible in terms of all observable characters.
We thus use a propensity score to quantify the similarity and form a control
group by matching one VC-backed rm with a non-VC-backed rm and on
condition of each having a similar propensity score. Since the VC investment
should be made independent (or random) if conditional on certain characters,
the selection of these characteristics is critical. We consider variables that
are commonly cited in the literature, namely, rm age, rm size as measured
by asset, sales, employment, capital intensity and Malmquist index; and also
three dummies: industry dummy which specifying the industry bias, the state
dummy signaling the existing of government intervention and the patent
dummy showing whether the rm had ever registered at least one patent.
To nd the signicance of the dierence in performance between VC-backed
rms with their selected counterpart across the prescribed time period, we
applied Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test and Kruskal-Wallist test.
This paper is arranged as follows - following the introduction, section two
provides literature review; section three outlines the methodology adopted; section
four claries the source of the data as well as selecting the variables to measure
both innovation and representing the VC related attributes of the rms; section
ve presents a series of empirical results and brief explanations; section six,
discusses the possible underlying reasons behind VCs ineectiveness and section
seven summarizes.
2 Literature review
Studies on the relationship between VC and innovation began in the 1990s.
However, There is no agreement amongst researchers as to whether VC conducts
an indispensable role in improving innovation amongst rms or industries. Those
disagreements are contained mostly within two elds: is VC and innovation linked
and, if so, what kind of relationship do they exhibit. Such research is encapsulated
by four main theories: 1) VC acts as a spur for innovation, 2) innovation leads to
VC investment, 3) VC is neutral to innovation and 4) VC inhibits innovation.
42.1 VC spurs innovation
Most of studies observed a positive relationship between innovation and VC
investment at both sector and rm level. Kortum and Lerner [34] found that at
the industrial level, VC's impact on innovation is three to four times greater than
the impact of R&D. Later, Gompers and Lerner [22] noticed that VC-backed rms
created nearly one third of total market value of all the public companies in the
US. Using German data, Tykvova [52] examined the positive correlation between
VC investment and patent application and again concluded that VC can stimulate
innovation at rm level. Inderst and Mueller [30] argued that, compared with
inactive investors, VC can speed up the growth of new ventures as measured by
market share, prots, etc, especially at their early stage. Other studies focused on
less developed capital market but also conrmed that VC-backed rms registered
more patents than non-VC-backed rms [4, 3, 19, 59].
Generally, VC's eectiveness spur innovation in three ways: the capital
eect, the contracting eect, and the innovation-ability-boosting eect. Firstly,
venture capitalists oer equity nance thereby bringing more new knowledge
and technology than traditional debt nance [45]. The equity nance gives
the investors opportunities with which to manage the rms and that in itself
reduces the risk of credit rationing and the avoidance of a \lemon market" and
information asymmetric [46]. Thus, VC ease the nancing constraints faced by
most high-tech new start-ups. Venture capitalists not only support new start-
ups with nancial support but also technological knowledge, product expertise
and their network [39, 49, 44]. Consequently, the costs of acquiring information
and implementing new rms' inventions are largely reduced [18]. Keuschnigg [33]
proved theoretically that if the industry has more active and experienced venture
capitalists, new start-ups' chance to success would be largely improved and
the innovation rates would then grow more rapidly. Secondly, Pehr-Johan and
Persson [38] examined the underlying reason that new start-ups would have more
invention from VC exiting mechanism. If venture capitalists choose to exit via
trade sales or an IPO, there would be an incentive to ensure the funded rm is
attractive through encouraging innovation and registering more patents as patent
applications indicate the company's potential in improving its cash ow and may
even encourage incumbent rms to make attractive bids to buy such innovative
companies to avoid future competition.
2.2 Innovation leads VC investment
However, some researchers argued that the VC spurring innovation phenomena
might actually be the reverse. Hirukawa and Ueda [29] established the innovation
rst hypothesis, which states that the arrivals of technology innovation can
stimulate new business opportunities and bring out new start-ups to exploit
such opportunities. Since those new rms do not have enough tangible assets or
collaterals, they are constrained by not being able to acquire debt from banking
systems. Thus, they seek VC to meet their nancial budgets [9, 21, 41]. In addition,
the selection process in VC investment lters out less innovative rms by reference
to their performance in patenting. Thus, comparatively innovative rms could
more easily attract VC investment.
52.3 VC is neutral to innovation
Some researchers also asserted that VC did not exert any impact on innovation.
The observed positive correlation is caused rstly by other unobserved factors
such as investment opportunities, technology transformation, etc. Therefore,
innovation growth is not necessarily created by VC but by increasing business
opportunities [55, 11]. And secondly, the positive correlation might be caused by
the problematic methodologies adopted by some researchers, since the selection
eect and the VC impact on innovation can hardly be separated by regression
analysis. Later, the idea of constructing a counterfactual twin rm was adopted
and researchers [28, 16, 8, 26] began to use the propensity score matching
(PSM) method to nd the matched non-VC-backed twin rms. However, Engel
and Keilbach [16] concluded that the causality between VC and innovation is weak
based on German data. Once the rms are VC funded, they display higher growth
rates but do not dier in their innovative output from comparable rms. The
study [40] of Austrian VC market also comes to the same conclusion: VC-backed
rms do not exhibit high growth in patenting.
Besides, people argued that such weak causality may be due to the
measurement of innovation, but not the innovation itself [26]. Bottazzi and Peri [8]
stated that patent is not the nal step of the innovation path and using patent
applications alone to indicate innovation could be biased; indeed the innovation
brought in by venture capitalists is not only limited to product innovation, but
could also lead to process innovation which can inuence the rms' managerial
skills, market capacity and protability. Researchers turn to use multi-indices
to capture the true eect upon innovation. Some studies use TFP and Labor
Productivity to depict innovation [54, 55]. They found that in manufacturing
industry, VC does not exhibit great inuence on the industry's TFP growth
although it largely improved labor productivities. Jain and Kini [31], Peneder [40]
Hellman and Puri [28], Bottazzi and Da Rin [7] also found that VC-backed
companies do not have greater registered patents in comparison to non-VC-backed
companies but they do reveal greater growth rates in terms of cash ow and
sales. Thus, such researchers conclude that VC might improve a rm's process
innovation, something which remains unobservable through concentrating upon
their patenting activities.
2.4 VC inhibits innovation
Other researchers believe that VC inhibits innovation [5, 48, 14], as most venture
capitalists would rather invest in understood innovations rather than radical
innovation or remain focused on commercializing the current technology and exit
through an IPO or trade sale. Stuck and Weingarten [47] examined 1,303 electronic
high-tech rms which listed on the US stock market and they concluded that
the VC-backed rms has a lower innovation growth rate than others. Caselli
et. al. [10] studied a sample of 37 Italian VC-backed rms that went public on
the Italian Stock Exchange between 1995 and 2004, and they found that after
receiving VC, the rms experienced high sales growth but fewer patent activities.
By using TFP as the innovation indicator, Hirukawa and Ueda [54] found that
VC's impact on innovation varies dierently among industries, for example, in
6drugs and the scientic instrument industry, VC could lower future TFP. In their
later study [29],they also found that 1-year lagged VC investment is negatively
connected with both TFP growth and patent counts.
The underlying reasons of such negative relations may be due to the
short-sightedness and the potential conict between entrepreneurs and venture
capitalists. First, VC has its life cycles, most investors want to get their money
back within its life span, and thus, they only focus on business plan and
product that can be easily commercialized. Secondly, some venture capitalists put
much of the fund not into research but into building relationships and social
networking [47]. Thirdly, some venture capitalists would replicate one rm's new
idea into other rms which are also in their rm portfolio [53]. In order to protect
their technology from replicating, entrepreneurs prefer to do less research and
innovation [48]. Other reasons inhibiting innovation are due to inecient strategic
decisions [32, 13]. When the nancial resources are abundant, entrepreneurs might
make reckless decisions without considering negative outcomes [43]. George [20]
analyzed privately-owned rms in the US and nds that protability declines when
rms' assets grows. Also, such negative correlation can be consistent with the
boom and bust, that is growth in VC investment under economic boom conditions
would lead to a slowdown in TFP growth [1].
By analyzing the current literature, it is clear that there is no clear agreement
on whether observed innovation is triggered by VC nancing. Such diverse
conclusions might possibly be due to the limited scope and methodologies of
those studies: i.e. researchers focused on either rm level samples or industrial
level samples. For instance, at the rm level, Hellmann and Puri [28] and
Engel [16] studied the correlation between VC and rms' performance and
patenting activities. At industry level, Kortum and Lerner [34], Tykova [52]and
Hirukawa and Ueda [29] examined the relationship between VC and industrial
innovation via regression.
On the one hand, if the study focuses simply on industry aspect, the study
will fail to capture the eectiveness of VC investment below industry level. On
the other hand, if the studies only focus on rm level statistics, it cannot capture
the overall inuence of VC or the impacts its externalities. Thus based on such
observation, we propose to use both rm level and industry level datasets to test
both the direct and indirect eects caused by VC and whether such eects are
signicant.
3 Methodology
The aim of this study is to nd out whether and how the VC can aect rms
innovation. The degree of innovation therefore needs to be properly measured and
quantied by a series of well recognized indicators such as patent counts, TFP
growth, etc. Since the innovation can be triggered by multiple factors other than
VC, we want to distinguish the contribution made solely by VC nancing. In order
to ensure an ecient measure of the VC contribution, we apply a matching process
which is able to make other factors conditionally independent to the VC. The
VC impact is evaluated based on the comparison between the matched pair rms
during a given time window. Finally, we further explore the causal links between
7VC and innovation by examining whether VC leads innovation or innovation leads
VC based on regression analysis.
3.1 Innovation indicator
It is known that a rm's innovation can not be captured by a single measurement.
Innovation is sub-divided into two categories, namely product innovation and
process innovation [56]. The former aims at increasing price-cost margins by
developing new products. In other words, it gives the rm monopoly rent to enlarge
its market shares and prots. Engel and Keilbach [17], Caselli et. al. [10] and
Peneder [40] used the number of patents and R&D inputs to measure the product
innovation. Process innovation on the other hand describes innovation that changes
rm's management strategies and results in higher operational eciency and lower
unit production costs. Ueda and Hirukawa [29] and Chemmanur et. al. [11] used
Total Factor Productivity (TFP) as well as TFP growth, or a Malmquist index,
to describe the process innovation of their samples. Instead of focusing on one
of innovation measurements, we propose to use both types of the measurements
to present a more complete picture of the relationship between Chinese VC and
innovation at both rm and industry level.
a. Patent
Number of patents is by far one of the most popular measures of product
innovation [17, 10, 23]. However, as a patent may vary in its nature, for
instance, utility patent, design patent, plant patent, etc and a patent may not
be commercialized or venture capitalists might simply encourage a rm to patent
their innovation rather than to innovate [54], patent numbers consequently may
not represent fully a rm's ability to innovate.
b. Malmquist Total Factor Productivity index
The Malmquist Total Factor Productivity index or Malmquist index is
a measure of productivity growth. The aim of using a Malmquist index is
to nd out whether the productivity growth can be attributed to VC. The
potential mechanism between VC and productivity growth has been addressed in
literature [29, 11, 54]. Since the denition of productivity function is less rigid,
dierent formats with various economic implications have been adopted. In order
to make the measure of productivity more adaptive, Majumdar proposed data
envelopment methodology (DEA) to nd out an ecient frontier where the most
productive rms are located [36]. The location is dened by either the quantity of
inputs per unit of output (input orientated), or the quantity of outputs per unit of
input (output orientated). DEA is a non-parametric mathematical programming
approach which denes a linear transformation vector  for each decision making
unit(rm) i,
min; ;
Subject to  yi + Y   0;
xi  X  0;
  0;P
N  = 1:
(1)
where fX;Y g = ffx1; y1g; fx2; y2g; : : :g represents the collection of all available
rms, fx; yg represents a pair of technical input and output,   0 is a scalar
8proportional to the degree of eciency, with a value of 1 indicating a point on
the ecient frontier. N is the total number of inputs and outputs while the
convexity constraint
P
N  = 1 aims to accommodate variable returns to scale.
Thus the value of  we found here can show the productivity for a given rm
at a particular time. In order to measure the productivity growth of the rms,
we use the Malmquist index which is a \combination" of a few \distances" found
by DEA. It is calculated by using cross-period distance function, Dt1i (x
t0 ; yt0),
shows the eciency measure of rm i using observations at time t0 relative to the
eciency frontier found at time t1. The input orientated Malmquist productivity
index consists of four distance functions,
M t+1i (x
t+1; yt+1; xt; yt) =

Dti(x
t+1; yt+1)
Dti(x
t; yt)
Dt+1i (x
t+1; yt+1)
Dt+1i (x
t; yt)
 1
2
(2)
By using Malmquist productivity index, we can decomposed it into changes in
eciency and changes in technology,
M t+1i (x
t+1; yt+1; xt; yt) =
Dt+1i (x
t+1; yt+1)
Dti(x
t; yt)

Dti(x
t+1; yt+1)
Dt+1i (x
t+1; yt+1)
Dti(x
t; yt)
Dt+1i (x
t; yt)
 1
2
(3)
where rst term shows the changes in eciency from t to t+ 1, the second term
indicates the geometric mean of changes in technology from t to t+ 1. The changes
are quantied by the distance away from frontier.
3.2 Evaluation of VC impact by matching process
VCs tend to select higher quality rms [22] in order to value their investments.
As a matter of fact, many innovations that have been made by VC-backed
rms should be attributed to some internal factors other than the external
VC investments. Since the aim of this paper is to nd out the eects of VC
on innovation, matched non-VC-backed rms must be found to compare with
VC-backed rms according to a set of a priori dened characteristics. Such a
matching process aims to avoid possible selection bias. The possibility of such
bias arises because the apparent dierence between dierent rms may depend on
characteristics that aect whether or not a rm received VC rather than the eect
of VC per se. We use the propensity score method to reduce the bias as much
as possible. The idea of the propensity score matching is to nd each VC-backed
rm a comparable non-VC-backed rm that in the same year has the most similar
probability (i.e. propensity score) of receiving VC investment. The probability is
calculated by a logit (or probit) regression based on a number of characteristics,
also known as covariates, which are used to distinguish VC-backed from non-
VC backed rms. The dependent variable of the logit (probit) regression is the
VC dummy, whether the rm has received VC nancing. By pairing VC-backed
rms(treated group) with non-VC-backed rms (control group) provided they have
same or very similar propensity score, thus \randomizes" the VC nancing. In
other words, the VC is made to be independent to the rm characterized by the
9selected covariates. The comparison between the treated group and the control
group can thus be fair and ecient.
The control group is then formed by picking non-VC-backed rms that have
appropriate propensity scores via an appropriate matching method. Such methods
are believed to play a key role in robust estimations of treatment eects. We
considered a number of matching methods. The nearest-neighbour matching
pairs each VC backed rm with exactly a non-VC-backed rm with the closest
propensity score. It does not consider the distribution of propensity scores of either
VC backed or non-VC-backed rms. Stratication matching requires a relatively
even distribution of propensity scores in both groups. These two matching methods
are however inappropriate in our study due to the signicant dierences in
covariates that of both VC-backed and non-VC-backed rms.
We therefor conducted Dierence-in-Dierences(DID) approach to evaluate
VC's eectiveness in promoting innovation. The DID estimation we used in this
paper is a nonparametric regression based on a kernel-based matching. It can both
smooth the unknown function of the mechanism VC exerts on innovation and
allows comparison between two-period data [24, 27, 6]. By calculating the weighted
mean of the controlled group, DID indicates the average dierence between
dierences amongst the treated group and those on average amongst the matched
group, which shows the average treatment eect. Hence, the DID approach allows
us to further analyze the VC's eect on innovation by comparing VC-backed rms
and its counterfactuals under pre and post VC investment circumstances.
In addition, we propose to use the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test and Kruskal-
Wallis analysis of variance to test the signicance of the innovation eect
exerted by VC investment. The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test is a nonparametric
statistical test aimed at assessing whether one group of observations tends to
be stochastically larger than the other group of observations, similar to a t-
test. However the test is not based on the assumption on the normality of
the observations, which makes it more desirable than the t-test in estimating
the innovation eect. The independence requirement for the observations can be
met by involving prior propensity score analysis, under which VC-backed rms
and non-VC-back rms share the same features conditional on rm's covariates.
Similarly, Kruskal-Wallis test doesn't assume a normal distribution and is capable
of examining groups with unequal size (the kernel matching method may collect
a control group which has dierent number of Non-VC-backed rms than the
number of VC-backed rms in treated group). The Kruskal-Wallis test is a
nonparametric version of ANOVA with its null hypothesis being two groups of
observations originate from the same distribution.
3.3 Regression analysis
Regression analysis is a statistical technique for estimating the relationships among
variables. Investigator seeks to nd out the causal eect of one variable on another,
for example, the increase of patent counts on VC nancing. In this paper, we
seek to estimate the quantitative eect of VC on the development of innovation at
dierent time periods with assessable statistical signicance.
In reality, any eort to quantify the eects of VC on innovation development
without considering other factors may also inuence innovation and could cause
10
omitted variable bias. In this paper, we assume that innovation can only be
triggered by VC and thus a simple linear regressive result can signal whether
there is a causal relationship. Since many innovation-active rms with reputable
historical performance, though young in the market, can access many alternative
nancing sources. The empirical results can be a sucient whilst not a necessary
evidence to the causal relationship between VC and innovation.
4 Data collection and description
4.1 Data source
The data for the empirical tests are taken from several dierent sources:
ZDB (Zero2IPO Database), Wind database, NBSC, annual reports of \Venture
Capital Development in China", \China Statistical Yearbook on Science and
Technology", \China Statistical Yearbook on Intellectual Property" and CNIPR
(China Intellectual Property Right Net) website. China Statistical Yearbook on
Science and Technology and China Statistical Yearbook on Intellectual Property
remain the most authentic source. Additionally, industrial data of aggregated R&D
input and patent applications was gathered from these two Yearbooks. Data on
rms' patenting activities are collected rm by rm via CNIPR.
ZDB is the timeliest professional database to provide information on VC and
PE investments in China and it contains information on 4700 cases of VC/PE
investments, mergers and acquisitions commencing from 1992. Furthermore, it also
contains the data from 2007 to 2011 relating to the VC investments according to
the industry classication system. Data is drawn from its monthly questionnaire
surveys and authoritative media disclosure including the National Bureau of
Statistics of China. Cases and nancial values of VC investment were collected
from ZDB at both rm and industry level.
WIND database is the most authentic database for collecting nancial data
of listed companies in SSE (Shanghai Stock Exchange) and SZSE (Shenzhen
Stock Exchange). Those companies are divided into 13 branches according to the
2002's National Industrial Classication of all Economic Activities. We collected
the nancial data and issuance information of all listed but non-service-sector
companies from WIND. Because the balance sheets of companies in service sector
are quite dierent from the others, and also, those companies seldom have patents
applications.
[Table 1 about here.]
Table 1 summarizes the sample rm statistics. Most of VC-backed rms
as well as non-VC-backed rms are collected from two major industry sectors:
Manufactory and Information Technology. The majority of VC-backed rms have
experienced some form of intervention or support by the government (state) while
for the non-VC-backed rms, government intervention is minimal. Finally, VC is
becoming more active and extensive over the past period.
4.2 Variable selection
a. Innovation sensitive variables
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The variables used to compute TFP growth at rm level and industry level
are quite dierent. At rm level, the variables chosen follow the criteria proposed
by Dyson [15]: 1) the input factors should cover all used resources and be
common to all rms and 2) the output factors should reect rms activities and
performance [25]. Accordingly we use the liquidity ratio, working capital, average
number of employees, intangible assets and tangible xed assets as the input
and sales and prot margin as the output. All the nominal values were deated
by consumer prices each year and each company. The visible correlation among
selected variables is displayed in Fig. 1.
[Figure 1 about here.]
b. Firm descriptive covariates
The propensity score is calculated by logit (or probit) regression where the
dependent variable is a dummy with value 1 indicating receiving VC and otherwise
0; independent variables include rm age, rm size measured by total assets and
employment of the rm, industry dummy [40, 12], state dummy [12] and capital
intensity [58]. The state dummy is particularly introduced in this study to include
the government support/intervention which has always been a determinative factor
in the Chinese market. We measure the degree of 'state involvement' by examining
the types of largest shareholders. If the largest shareholder are government entities
or state-owned enterprise, then we dene this company has state involvement,
and denoted as 1; otherwise, we dene it without any state involvement and
denoted as 0. The state dummy data is taken from Sinon-CCER database 4.
The industry dummy is proposed to identify which industry the rm belongs to.
As VC is most prevalent in manufacturing and information technology, rms are
excluded who do not belong to these two industries. The industry dummy is 1
means the rm belongs to manufactory industry while 0 means the rm belongs
to information technology industry. The capital intensity is dened as the total
capital per employee. Malmquist measure is dened as the calculated Malmquist
index which measure the productivity growth in the past. Patent dummy indicates
whether the rm has received patent before. The value of patent dummy of a rm
on a certain year would be 1 as long as one (or more) patent has been registered
before, and otherwise 0.
The observable heterogeneity among VC-backed and non-VC-backed rms are
represented only by the selected covariates which are, therefore, critical to the
quality of the matching process. The discriminative eciency of those covariates
can be not only proved by reference to the literature but also by the statistics
shown in the \Unmatched" rows of Table 2.
5 Empirical research on Chinese data
Data was collected from rms operating in two industries, manufactory and
information technology, both with and without VC nancing from 1994-2011. In
order to get a full picture of the causal relationship between VC and innovation, we
implement dierence-in-dierences matching approach based on propensity score
matching and regression analysis respectively. Both patent counts and TFP growth
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have been used, but due to data absence prior to 2006, a Malmquist index was
calculated and a rm matching by propensity score from the years 2006-2011.
Firm level regression analysis was conducted with a focus on individual rm's
innovation behaviour with the aim of the analysis to identify the \direction" of the
causal relationship: whether it is the VC that leads innovation, or innovation leads
VC.
5.1 Matching analysis
[Table 2 about here.]
Table 2 summaries the descriptive statistics of nine quoted covariates,
Age, Asset, Sales, Employment, Capital intensity, State, Industry, Patent,
Malmquist(calculated by Sales and Prot margin). Due to the data absence for
earlier years, the value of covariates has been weighted averaged over 6 years (2006-
2011). For example, the age of unmatched VC-backed rms can be calculated by
age =
Pn
t=1 x(t)w(t)Pn
t=1 w(t)
(4)
where x(t) is the averaged age at year t, w(t) is the number of observations at
year t, n is the total number of years. While for the matched non-VC-backed
rms, the number of observations is determined by the matching scheme. As this
paper adopts the kernel matching scheme, a weighted mean matching method,
the number of selected non-VC-backed rms may vary according to the parameter
setting. The actual number of observations is shown in Table 3. The statistics
shows that apart from sales and industry, other seven covariates all have quite
strong discriminative ability in distinguishing VC-backed from non-VC-backed
rms. As shown, VC tends to nance young, asset-light, small size (by the number
of employees and capital per employee), government supported and previously
innovative (higher Malmquist index value and more patents) rms. The bias
measures the degree of dierence between VC-backed and non-VC-backed rms
in terms of the changes in the covariates. The aim of propensity score matching
is to make the value of covariates of VC-backed rms close to those of non-VC-
backed rms. Therefore a perfect matching would evidence no bias. The reduction
of bias reects the eciency of propensity score matching. T test results indicate
that apart from sales mean value of covariates of VC-backed rms are signicantly
dierent from those of non-VC-backed rms before matching. After matching,
though the value of T statistics is still too large to indicate insignicant dierence
between VC-backed rms and non-VC-backed rms as we intend to achieve, the
reduction in the value of T statistics still shows the eectiveness of propensity
score matching. However, dierence between VC backed rm and non VC backed
rms might still be aected to small extent by remaining dierences in covariates.
[Table 3 about here.]
Table 3 shows the innovation performance, measured by patent counts and
Malmquist indices (TFP growth) calculated by either sales or prot margin, of
both VC-backed rms and their selected counterparts and non-VC-backed rms
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with similar propensity scores, before and after VC event. In order to account
for the time eects, 4 dierent window sizes (1 - 4 years span) were selected to
measure the VC impact at dierent points in the innovation process over time. In
order to make full use of the information available, all VC-backed rms' patent
counts and Malmquist indices were collected. Since the number of patents recorded
among the sample rms (listed on either Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock Exchange)
is small, the number of observations of patent counts is far less than the number of
available Malmquist indices. The number of observations, either patent counts or
Malmquist indices, is reducing as the time spread increases from 1 year to 4 years
because the data is only accessible during 2006 - 2011. The student-t statistics
provides a measure of \divergence" between VC-backed rms and non-VC-backed
rms. It can be seen that for most of time span as well as innovation measures,
VC enlarges the divergence. Therefore as both VC-backed and non-VC-backed
rms gain in terms of various innovation measures, we can conclude VC has some
positive inuence on recipient rms' innovation.
[Table 4 about here.]
Table 4 shows the Dierence-in-Dierences measure results and associated
signicance tests. We can rstly conclude that VC exerts a positive impact on
innovation though the impact is not signicant. Secondly, innovation does not
respond to VC nancing immediately. Regarding patent counts, 3 or 4 years might
be a better cycle period than 1 or 2 years. For TFP growth, VC tends to have
a longer eects but the inuence is not stable. Since the number of observations
is dierent for the dierent time windows, we introduce two signicant tests to
provide the further evidence. Since Dierence-in-Dierences calculates the distance
between the dierent innovation gains (i.e. increases on patent counts) of VC-
backed rms and non-VC-backed rms during a same period, two signicance
tests were applied to exam whether the two groups of innovation gains (two
distributions formed by repeated sampling) have the same mean (Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney) and variance (Kruskal-Wallis). The statistics shows that for patent
counts, apart from 4 year results, the other three DID measures are not reliable.
Their P values suggest that the null hypothesis that two groups of innovation
gains are signicantly dierent either by mean or variance cannot be rejected. For
the 4 year results, as the number of observation is limited (20 VC-backed and 25
non-VC-backed), the results are not conclusive. Whilst for the Malmquist indices,
the results are encouraging. Thus one can conrm a positive and sustainable VC
impact on TFP growth of recipient rms but the VC impact on patent counts is
visible but not reliable. Extra data and experiments in the future are needed to
ensure the robustness of the results.
5.2 Regression analysis
In order to verify whether the innovation-rst or VC-rst hypothesis is applicable
to Chinese VC market, we designed 3 experiments. The rst experiment aimed
at studying whether VC events, particularly the rst round, and/or R&D inputs
have leading or lagged impacts on rms' patent applying. The second is to nd
out whether the follow up VC are also eective on motivating rms' innovations.
The last one is to exam whether VC inputs can aect the TFP growth.
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[Figure 2 about here.]
Fig. 2 shows the potential relationship between the amount of rst round
VC being invested and the number of patents applied before and afterward the
event, as the rst round VC is known to has superior motivations on rms being
invested [51]. The gure shows a \VC rst" pattern as the gures in the right
column in Fig. 2 display clear trends (relative large K which means slope and R2
which represents the goodness of t) than the gures in the left column. Every
point in the Fig. 2 represents a VC event occurred for a rm. The lower number
of points in the bottom row is a reection of the limitation of rm data prior to
2006. Though the trend is visible, the causal relationship is still not signicant
due to a low R2 and sparse distribution around the regressive line, which implies
an untrusted regression. Another visible nding is both the trend and the level of
goodness of t are more evident with the increase in the time span. This result is
in line with what was found in the previous section, that innovation will respond
to the VC input but not immediately.
[Figure 3 about here.]
Fig. 3 uses R&D as input instead of VC. The linear regression results have
similar patterns as Fig. 2, whilst the trends are less clear, as the value of slope
K are found smaller and the goodness of t are also of lower levels. The external
VC can thus be proved to have more direct impacts on patent application than
internal R&D investments.
[Figure 4 about here.]
The all over VC eects on innovation is shown in Fig. 4. The trend is less clear
than the Fig. 2 as the following rounds of VC may not be as eective as the rst
round VC. The gure thus doublely conrms that the rst round VC is always
more inuential.
[Figure 5 about here.]
Fig. 5 pairs each VC investment with receiving rms' Malmquist indices in
dierent years. Neither the leading Malmquist indices nor the lagged Malmquist
indexes has signicant correlation with VC inputs as being shown by the almost
uniformly distributed patterns.
6 Why does VC in China has limited impact in innovation
The result of our empirical study supports the view that VC and innovation
are positively linked in China. But VC nancing is more ecient in supporting
the growth of TFP of recipient rms than their patent growth. The observed
increase in patenting can be attributed to both the VCs selection process and
VC nancing. Meanwhile, both VC-rst hypothesis and innovation rst hypothesis
were supported in the Chinese market. The above result comes to the conclusion
that the degree of VC inuence on innovation in China is not as signicant as
evidenced in many developed countries and those studies documented in literature.
The dierences between the Chinese and the western VC market might be
accounted for by the following four aspects.
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6.1 Government intervene
In contrast to other developed countries, Chinese government, especially the local
governments play a pivotal role in conducting VC investments. Aiming at boosting
the economy growth and solving the nancing problems for small and median
enterprises, many local governments establish Government Guided Funds to
connect those enterprise with qualied nancial intermediates. Sponsored by local
governments, such government funds collaborate with VCs by the ways of step-
by-step equity participation, government-following-up investment and investment
reimbursements/subsidies. With the help of the Government Guided Funds and
prevailing VCs, the shortage in capital faced by those new-born, mature and
reconstructed businesses would be largely improved.
The drawbacks of such Government Guided Funds in the real market operation
are: 1) Lack in continuity of the sources of the funds; 2) Conicts in interest
between Government Guided Funds and VC: VC investors would be more likely
to invest recklessly whilst Government Guided Funds have to consider government
policy requirements and the interest of general public. Besides, as the Government
Guided Funds need to ensure that their investment projects are compatible with
the reginal development strategy, the eectiveness of the Government Guided
Funds on supporting innovative rms has been therefore limited. 3) Low risk
tolerance of the Government Guided Funds. Since the Government Guided Funds
are linked to the scal account of local government, the safety requirements on
their capital are thus incompatible with the VC's requirement on high return.
Consequently the Government Guided Funds may not be able to promote VC in
depth.
6.2 Environmental condition
Appropriate environment conditions are indispensable for VC to promote
innovation in supported rms.
a. Market conditions. Due to the inecient low ratio of converting innovation
to marketable products, as well as the limitation on commercialization and
industrialization of the new tech products, the market is always short of investable
projects. Such shortage hinders the foundation of the development of the VC
market, intensies the competitiveness and over prices the investment costs.
Besides, the stage of capital market maturity is critical to a healthy
development of VC investment. The exit mechanism for VC is the most important
part in VC markets. Generally, such exits mechanism range from the most
successful (protable) IPO, equity transfer, management buyout, to the most
unsuccessful bankruptcy or liquidation. The success of exit depends heavily on
the development of the capital market. In the US, large numbers of successful
VC exits can be partly attributed to M&A as well as the establishment of the
NASDAQ. However, though China established its Growth Enterprise Market, the
exit mechanism for VC is still relatively undeveloped. Challenges such as lacking
of value-discovering ability and global nancial crisis limit the development of
the newborn Chinese Growth Enterprise Market and its crucial incorporation of
facilitating VC exit.
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b. Basic conditions. Firstly, we are short of professional VCs with extensive
knowledge of techniques, nance, management, marketing and law. Secondly,
other nancial intermediates need to be developed to support the VC market.
The development of other nancial services like credit ranking and consulting is
the most important driving force for further improvement of VC companies and
businesses. Those intermediates can bring together the investable projects and
appropriate VCs. Currently these intermediates are still at a very early stage in
their development.
6.3 Unqualied Venture Capitalists
In North America, VCs mainly invest in high-tech rms at their early stages. They
are active investors, usually appointing executives and monitoring closely during
the investment period. On the other hand, Private Equity (PE) is usually invested
in a rm's later stage. In the west, VC and PE have two very dierent implications
[42]. However, in China the two terms are often used interchangeably [2]. Besides,
the huge return from IPO makes Chinese VC investors prefer to invest in a
company at its pre-IPO stage rather than at its seed stage. Consequently, VC
investment can hardly be an alternative to solve problems of nancial constraints
that exist for most small but growing enterprises [50].
In China, VC funds are supported by governments, local or foreign
institutions/individuals. VCs in government funded VC are often former
government ocials who have less experience in capital operation. Besides, the
performance incentives for those investment executives are usually inadequate [2].
The lack of sucient incentives and experience in government backed VC may
reduce the likelihood of strong support and value-adding services [37].
Corporate-backed VC began its development after 1990s with managers
typically coming from securities rms, banks or industry [37]. Thus in contrast
to the mature foreign VC industry, China's VC industry has less qualied and
experienced VC managers. For example, White et. al. [57] found that managers in
domestic VC have only 2.1 average years of relevant experience while the average
length of tenure in foreign VC operating in China is 11.9 years. Besides, the foreign
VCs are usually able to provide contacts to potential customers and partners in
foreign markets [37].
Comparatively, the foreign VCs have greater expertise in VC management.
Whereas, the shortages of those experienced VCs are their politically vulnerability
and lack the intimate connections to Chinese government and local markets.
Because in China, governments hold most projects and resources, networking is
very important for VCs to nd an investment target. Thus, for domestic VCs,
they do not have the excellent manage skills and expertise to improve innovation
and growth rate of their funded rms. For the foreign VCs, they can hardly nd
satisfying investment projects. Those aspects limited VCs' role in promoting the
operation eciency and growth rate of the funded rms.
In China, VC supported rms are characterised by low equity ratios a feature
attributable rstly by rms' unwillingness to dilute their shares and secondly by
VCs limited ability in making appropriate investment strategies and controlling
the associated risks. On the other hand, the low equity ratio in a single rm
reects the over diversication of investment which makes it impossible for the
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VCs to focus on the most valuable R&D with the consequence that VC-backed
rms are unable to further develop new technology and improve their innovation
ability. Thus, the dierence we observed in innovation and performance between
VC-backed and non-VC-backed rms is somehow insignicant.
6.4 Immature Limited Partner
The immature of Limited Partner (LP) is another reason lead to VC's
ineectiveness in China. In some developed VC markets, LPs are from wealthy
individuals, corporations, foundations, pension funds and endowments [2] and their
rights are limited to only those monies provided to the VC fund. However, in
China, LPs are an exception to this. The funds are typically corporate funds
related to banks or corporations. Such corporate VC allows additional interference
in the management of funds operation in one of two ways: rstly, LPs would
interfere with the funds operations and secondly, they could also intervene with
the funded rms to ensure the commitment in corporations' and the funded rms'
strategy [14].
Corporate VC on the one hand can provide the funded rms with novel
technology and add to their rm values. However, on the other hand, it might
interfere with the development of the funded rms' strategies to prevent them
from competing with their parent company. Thus sometimes, although we observe
a positive relationship between VC investment and lagged patent activities, we
do not discover signicant increasing TFP and growth along with the investment.
Besides, LPs in China are also comprised by entrepreneurs from private-owned
companies. Those people distrust others to manage their money and would rather
manage their VC funds by themselves. Lacking the necessary managerial and
nancial experience, those funds either have poor performance or only focus on
high return business such as real estate. Therefore, Chinese VCs have diculties
in inducing innovations.
7 Summary
China's VC market began in the 1990s, however, its development was inhibited due
to inadequacies in the regulatory system and risk control mechanisms. It was not
until 1998 that China's VC industry started re-developing as Chinese governments
implemented a series of policies to stimulate and encourage the development of
high-tech rms and the VC market itself. In 2007, the VC industry underwent its
fastest development with the establishment of CGEM (China Growth Enterprise
Market, the equivalent to NASDAQ) and a new \Law of the People's Republic
of China on Partnerships". VC investments in China increased rapidly over the
last decade. Supported by the government, VC has brought out lots of innovative
rms like the Alibaba Group, Baidu.com and AsiaInfo Linkage, etc. It seems like
China's VC market is providing the wherewithal to cultivate innovation. However,
our study concludes with a less encouraging view:, namely VC in China is less
eective in improving rms' patenting and productivity growth.
The empirical nding does suggest that VC has a limited but positive eect
on patenting activities while its direct impact on recipient rms' TFP growth
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is somewhat stronger. Whilst the response of recipient rms' innovation to VC
nancing has some time delay. VC tends to lead innovation especially in patenting.
The reason behind might be explained by the special features of China's VC
industry:(1) VCs are sponsored and protected by government and their policies;
(2) the overall market context does not provide a VC-friendly environment; (3)VCs
needs more attention and education before becoming professional; (4) LPs tend to
interfere venture fund management.
In this paper, the research undertaken is still in the process of being understood
more fully. However it is clear that what was expected to be witnessed, namely
the impact of VC upon innovation in terms of short term patent growth and
TFP growth may not yet be demonstrable under the conditions prevailing within
Chinese market. However, instead of the expected impact on innovation, VC may
inuence the overall performance of a rm or even a group of rms within the
same industry, the so-called spillover eects. Future research being undertaken will
provide new evidence from Chinese market in the future.
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Table 1 Sample Composition for VC-backed and non-VC-backed rms
VC-backed Non-VC
Covariate VC
Amount
No. of
VC
No. of
rms
% No. of
rms
%
Industry Manufactory 26918 1500 293 75.3 1199 57.6
IT 5916 298 59 15.2 144 6.9
Others 1227 247 37 9.5 739 35.5
State Yes - - 332 85.4 970 46.6
No - - 42 10.8 993 47.7
Unknown - - 15 3.8 119 5.7
Year Before 5640 427 427 22.0 2044 13.3
2006 1793 142 142 7.3 2329 15.2
2007 3222 195 195 10.0 2276 14.8
2008 4306 251 251 12.9 2220 14.5
2009 6171 300 300 15.5 2171 14.1
2010 7910 326 326 16.8 2145 14.0
2011 5019 300 300 15.5 2171 14.1
Note: \State" dummy indicates the exists of government intervene of a rm up to
2011, repeated intervenes to a same rm don't count. \VC Amount" is the total
amount of VC received up to 2011 in million yuan. \No. of VC" is the number
of VC receipts up to 2011. \No. of rms" is the number of rms which have even
received VC up to 2011. For example, if a rm received VC support for 5 years by
2011, the contribution of the rm to the \No. of VC" is 5, while the contribution
to \No. of rms" is 1. The percentage is calculated only based on \No. of rms".
In the year column, \before" means the aggregate amount of VC investment
before year 2006.
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Table 2 The Statistic Description of Covariates: Average of data from 2006 to 2011
Covariate VC-backed Non-VC-
backed
Bias % T test
Age
Matched 6.992 7.568 8.238 3.254
Unmatched 6.992 13.58 94.23 31.48
Asset
Matched 1.38 e9 2.15 e9 55.80 6.545
Unmatched 1.38 e9 4.61 e9 234.1 11.33
Sales
Matched 7.00 e3 7.00 e3 0.000 0.002
Unmatched 7.00 e3 7.01 e3 0.143 0.168
Employ
Matched 1.40 e3 1.52 e3 8.571 0.654
Unmatched 1.40 e3 3.92 e3 180.0 22.89
Cap.Int.
Matched 7.65 e3 7.60 e3 -0.654 -1.373
Unmatched 7.65 e3 6.71 e3 -12.29 -6.351
State
Matched 0.887 0.768 -13.42 -6.235
Unmatched 0.887 0.555 -37.43 -55.87
Industry
Matched 0.835 0.842 0.838 0.941
Unmatched 0.835 0.889 6.467 6.642
Patent(d)
Matched 0.407 0.384 -5.651 -1.214
Unmatched 0.407 0.334 -17.94 -10.25
Malm(s)
Matched 3.845 3.741 -2.705 -0.354
Unmatched 3.845 3.456 -10.12 -8.211
Malm(p)
Matched 4.715 4.671 -0.932 -0.993
Unmatched 4.715 4.481 -4.963 -1.119
Note: The table summarizes the statistics of covariates for both VC-backed
and non-VC-backed rms during 2006-2011. The value of every covariate
has been averaged by the number of its yearly observations. \Employ"
indicates the number of employees, and \Cap.Int." indicates the capital
intensity. \State",\Industry",\Patent(d)" are three dummy variable. \Malm(s)"
and \Malm(p)" are the Malmquist indices calculated by Sales and Prot margin.
\Unmatched" means all original available observations, while \matched" non-VC-
backed rms are those selected by the propensity score matching scheme. \Bias
%" measures the percentage dierence in covariate between VC-backed rms and
non-VC-backed rms. \T test" shows the student-t test statistics with the null
hypothesis that VC-backed rms and non-VC-backed rms have same mean value
of covariates.
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Table 3 The Statistic Description of VC Impact
Pre - VC Post - VC
Period VC-
backed
Control T VC-
backed
Control T
1 Yr
Patent
Mean 19.65 19.01 6.004 21.14 19.91 6.015
Obs 89 91 - 89 91 -
Malm(s)
Mean 3.511 3.472 1.237 3.752 3.653 0.982
Obs 285 297 - 285 297 -
Malm(p)
Mean 4.352 4.286 4.412 4.896 4.711 5.086
Obs 285 297 - 285 297 -
2 Yr
Patent
Mean 15.64 14.61 3.128 17.98 16.00 4.670
Obs 45 52 - 45 52 -
Malm(s)
Mean 4.021 3.997 1.982 4.251 4.012 1.315
Obs 234 247 - 234 247 -
Malm(p)
Mean 4.220 3.984 3.008 4.885 4.391 5.672
Obs 234 247 - 234 247 -
3 Yr
Patent
Mean 16.45 16.02 2.765 20.25 19.22 3.130
Obs 32 38 - 32 38 -
Malm(s)
Mean 3.598 3.532 1.965 3.952 3.891 2.071
Obs 201 209 - 201 209 -
Malm(p)
Mean 4.251 4.037 2.312 4.851 4.513 2.998
Obs 201 209 - 201 209 -
4 Yr
Patent
Mean 16.54 16.81 -0.231 20.21 19.81 2.871
Obs 20 23 - 20 23 -
Malm(s)
Mean 3.625 3.412 0.980 4.001 3.765 1.769
Obs 165 172 - 165 172 -
Malm(p)
Mean 4.210 4.241 -0.098 4.852 4.765 1.654
Obs 165 172 - 165 172 -
Note: The table summarizes the innovation performance of both VC-backed
rms and selected non-VC-backed rms in the control group at dierent time
spans. \Patent" shows the average number of patents over given number of
\Obs" observations, while \Malm(s)" and \Malm(p)" are the Malmquist indices.
\Control" represents the selected non-VC-backed rms that form the control
group. \T" is the Student-t statistics which is used to exam the dierence between
VC-backed rms and non-VC-backed rms in terms of innovation measure. The
\Period", i.e. 1 Yr, means the length of time window between \Pre-VC" and \Post-
VC".
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Table 4 The Dierence-in-Dierences Measure and Statistics Signicant Test
Period Mann-Whitney Kruskal-Wallis
DID Z Pr Chi2 Pr
1 Yr
Patent 0.590 1.501 0.128 2.564 0.095
Malm(s) 0.060 7.299 0.005 72.06 0.008
Malm(p) 0.119 15.34 0.000 248.1 0.000
2 Yr
Patent 0.950 2.853 0.080 7.546 0.079
Malm(s) 0.215 4.766 0.017 48.71 0.015
Malm(p) 0.258 17.76 0.000 279.0 0.000
3 Yr
Patent 0.600 5.765 0.017 9.364 0.010
Malm(s) -0.005 -5.921 0.000 34.50 0.000
Malm(p) 0.124 15.02 0.000 220.0 0.000
4 Yr
Patent 0.670 6.132 0.005 12.20 0.007
Malm(s) 0.023 4.887 0.010 51.08 0.012
Malm(p) 0.118 12.98 0.000 145.3 0.000
Note: The table reports the Dierence-in-Dierences measures with associated
signicance test results. \DID" is the Dierence-in-Dierences measure, \Z" and
\Chi2" are the statistics generated by Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test and Kruskal-
Wallis analysis of variance, \Pr" is the associated probability (P value). The null
Hypothesis H0 indicates \there's no dierence between two groups". From the
regression, Yr 1 and Yr 2 do not exhibit signicant dierence in patent outcomes,
however, Yr 3 and Yr 4 do show the dierence..
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Figure 1 The gure shows the quantitative relations among liquidity ratio, working
capital, employees (employment), intangible assets, tangible xed assets, sales
and prot margin. The number of patents is also illustrated for reference. The
variables are scaled for better review.
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Figure 2 The gures show the potential causality between the rst round VC
support and the patent counts during 7 years (1994-2011). Both the number
of patents and the amount of VC are taken the logarithm. K represents the
slope and R2 indicates the goodness of t. Each point in the gure represents
a \VC event": the amount of VC input and the consequent innovation output
in terms of patent counts. The gures show weak causal relationship between
VC nancing and patent counts at dierent steps of lag and lead. The \VC
rst" pattern is more clear than the \Patent rst" pattern.
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Figure 3 A comparative experiment shows the relationship between R&D input
made on the year when rst round VC happened and the number of patents
acquired in the leading and lagged years during 7 years (1994-2012). The
gures show similar patterns as Fig. 2 and \R&D rst" trend though not as
signicant as \VC rst" trend in Fig. 2.
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Figure 4 The gures depict the eects of all rounds VC to the number of patents in
the leading and lagged years.
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Figure 5 The gures draws the VC inputs against the Malmquist indexes in the
leading and lagged periods.
